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a b s t r a c t
By Shapley’s (1964) theorem, a matrix game has a saddle point whenever each of its 2× 2
subgames has one. In other words, all minimal saddle point free (SP-free) matrices are of
size 2 × 2. We strengthen this result and show that all locally minimal SP-free matrices
also are of size 2×2. In other words, if A is a SP-freematrix in which a saddle point appears
after deleting an arbitrary row or column then A is of size 2×2. Furthermore, we generalize
this result and characterize the locally minimal Nash equilibrium free (NE-free) bimatrix
games.
Let us recall that a two-person game form is Nash-solvable if and only if it is tight
[V. Gurvich, Solution of positional games in pure strategies, USSR Comput. Math. andMath.
Phys. 15 (2) (1975) 74–87]. We show that all (locally) minimal non-tight game forms are
of size 2 × 2. In contrast, it seems difficult to characterize the locally minimal tight game
forms (while all minimal ones are just trivial); we only obtain some necessary and some
sufficient conditions. We also recall an example from cooperative game theory: a maximal
stable effectivity function that is not self-dual and not convex.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. On minimality and local minimality
Amapping g : I× J → A is called amatrix if A is the set of real numbers, A = R, bimatrix if A = R2 is the plane, and game
form if A is a finite set (of outcomes). In all the three cases we also assume that sets I and J are finite.
Let g satisfy a property, or in other words, belong to a family F . We call g minimal in F if g ∈ F but g ′ 6∈ F for any strict
predecessor g ′ : I ′ × J ′ → A of g , that is, for any restriction of g to I ′ × J ′, where I ′ ⊆ I, J ′ ⊆ J , and at least one of these two
containments is strict.
Furthermore, g is called locally minimal in F if g ∈ F but g ′ 6∈ F for any elementary restriction (immediate predecessor) g ′
of g , that is, for any restriction of g to I ′× J ′ such that |I \ I ′|+ |J \ J ′| = 1; in other words, if property F disappears whenever
we delete a row or column from g .
For more details on minimality and local minimality, we refer the reader to Section 1 of [3], where these two concepts
are defined for arbitrary posets. Here, let us just recall the following.
A family (property) F is called monotone if g ∈ F whenever g ′ ∈ F for every restriction (predecessor) g ′ of g .
Let us call F weakly monotone if for every not minimal g ∈ F there is an elementary restriction (immediate predecessor)
g ′ of g such that g ′ ∈ F .
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Obviously, every monotone family is weakly monotone.
It is also clear that concepts of minimality and local minimality in F are equivalent if and only if F is weakly monotone;
see Claim 1 in [3].
In [3], it was shown that the complementary connected d-graphs (CC-graphs) form a weakly monotone family, while,
the graphs with χ > ω, kernel free digraphs, and some other families do not.
In this paper we will prove that the SP-free matrices and not Nash-solvable game forms are weakly monotone families,
while the NE-free bimatrix games, Nash-solvable game forms, and some other families are not.
Let us also recall that local minimality of g with respect to F can be verified in polynomial time whenever F is given by
a polynomial membership oracle. Indeed, the membership test should be executed only for g and |I| + |J| its elementary
restrictions (immediate predecessors). In contrast, it takes exponential time to verify the minimality of g with respect to F ,
since the set of all restrictions (predecessors) of g is exponential in its size.
In Section 5 we also recall a problem from cooperative game theory related to characterizing maximal stable effectivity
functions.
1.2. Minimal and locally minimal matrices without saddle points
A matrix (or matrix game) [a(i, j); i ∈ I, j ∈ J] is a real-valued mapping a : I × J → R. Its rows I and columns J are
the strategies of two players: R, the maximizer, and C , the minimizer. A situation (that is, a pair of strategies) (i, j) ∈ I × J
is called a saddle point (in pure strategies) if no player can improve the result by choosing another strategy provided the
opponent keeps the same strategy, that is, if
a(i, j) ≥ a(k, j) ∀k ∈ I and a(i, j) ≤ a(i, `) ∀` ∈ J, (1.1)
that is, a(i, j) is a maximum in its column j and minimum in its row i.
It is well known and easy to see that if (i, j) and (k, `) are two saddle points then (i, `) and (k, j) are also saddle points
and
a(i, j) = a(k, j) = a(i, `) = a(k, `).
Furthermore, a matrix game has a saddle point if and only if its maxmin and minmax are equal, that is,
vR = max
i∈I
min
j∈J a(i, j) = minj∈J maxi∈I a(i, j) = vC . (1.2)
It is also well known and obvious that vR ≤ vC holds for all real matrices.
In particular, it is easy to see that a 2 × 2 matrix (|I| = |J| = 2) has no saddle point if and only if both entries of one
diagonal are strictly larger than both entries of the other diagonal, that is,
min{a(1, 1), a(2, 2)} > max{a(1, 2), a(2, 1)} or
min{a(1, 2), a(2, 1)} > max{a(1, 1), a(2, 2)}. (1.3)
In 1964 Shapley proved that there are no other minimal saddle point free (SP-free) matrices.
Theorem 1 ([17]). A matrix has a saddle point whenever each of its 2× 2 submatrices has one.
Clearly, this condition is only sufficient but not necessary. Indeed, row i and column j uniquely definewhether a situation
(i, j) is a saddle point or not; the rest of the matrix is irrelevant.
Shapley’s proof of Theorem 1 is short and elegant. Assume indirectly that a matrix A has no saddle point. Then vR < vC .
Let us choose a number v such that vR < v < vC .
Since v < vC , each column in A contains an entry strictly greater than v. Let us choose a column j ∈ J in which the
number of such entries is minimal. Still, a(i, j) > v for some row i ∈ I .
Since v > vR, each row contains an entry strictly lesser than v. In particular, a(i, j′) < v for some j′ ∈ J . Clearly, j′ 6= j,
since a(i, j) > v > a(i, j′). Moreover, these inequalities and the choice of j imply that a(i′, j) ≤ v < a(i′, j′) for some i′ ∈ I .
The 2× 2 submatrix {i, i′} × {j, j′} has no saddle point, by (1.3). 
We strengthen this theorem and show that not only all minimal but also all locallyminimal SP-free matrices are of size
2× 2.
Theorem 2. If a matrix [a(i, j) | i ∈ I, j ∈ J] is SP-free but a saddle point appears after deleting an arbitrary row or column of it
then |I| = |J| = 2.
The proof will be given in Section 2. Now, we will extend these results further to arbitrary (not necessarily zero-sum)
two-person games.
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1.3. Locally minimal bimatrix games without Nash equilibria
Again, let I and J be two finite sets of strategies of the players R and C , respectively. A bimatrix game (A, B) is defined as
a pair of mappings a : I × J → R and b : I × J → R that specify the utility (or payoff) functions of the players R and C ,
respectively. Now both players are maximizers.
A situation (i, j) ∈ I × J is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player can improve the result by choosing another strategy
provided the opponent keeps the same strategy, that is, if
a(i, j) ≥ a(k, j) ∀k ∈ I and b(i, j) ≥ b(i, `) ∀` ∈ J. (1.4)
Clearly, Nash equilibria generalize saddle points, which correspond to the zero-sum case: a(i, j)+ b(i, j) = 0 for all i ∈ I
and j ∈ J . However, unlike SP-free games, the minimal Nash equilibria free (NE-free) bimatrix games may be larger than
2× 2. Let us recall an example from [12].
Example 1. Consider a 3× 3 bimatrix game (A, B) such that
b(i1, j1) > b(i1, j2) ≥ b(i1, j3),
b(i2, j3) > b(i2, j1) ≥ b(i2, j2),
b(i3, j2) > b(i3, j3) ≥ b(i3, j1);
a(i2, j1) > a(i1, j1) ≥ a(i3, j1),
a(i1, j2) > a(i3, j2) ≥ a(i2, j2),
a(i3, j3) > a(i2, j3) ≥ a(i1, j3).
Naturally, for situations in the same row (respectively, column) the values of b (respectively, a) are compared, since player
R controls rows and has utility function a, while C controls columns and has utility function b.
It is easy to verify that:
b(i1, j1) is the unique maximum in row i1 and a(i1, j1) is a second largest in the column j1. Similarly,
b(i2, j3) is the unique maximum in i2 and a(i2, j3) is a second largest in j3;
b(i3, j2) is the unique maximum in i3 and a(i3, j2) is a second largest in j2;
a(i2, j1) is the unique maximum in j1 and b(i2, j1) is a second largest in i2;
a(i1, j2) is the unique maximum in j2 and b(i1, j2) is a second largest in i1;
a(i3, j3) is the unique maximum in j3 and b(i3, j3) is a second largest in i3.
Consequently, this game is NE-free, since no situation is simultaneously the best in its row with respect to b and in its
column with respect to a. Yet, if we delete a row or column then a Nash equilibrium appears. For example, let us delete i1.
Then the situation (i3, j2) becomes a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, b(i3, j2) is the largest in the row i3 and a(i3, j2) is a second
largest in the column j2, yet, the largest, a(i1, j2), was deleted. Similarly, the situations (i1, j1), (i2, j3), (i1, j2), (i3, j3), (i2, j1)
become Nash equilibria after deleting the lines i2, i3, j1, j2, j3, respectively. Thus, (A, B) is locally minimal NE-free bimatrix
game. Moreover, it is also minimal. Indeed, one can easily verify that all 2 × 2 subgames of (A, B) have a Nash equilibrium
and, of course, 1× 2, 2× 1, and 1× 1 games always have it.
In general, the following criterion of local minimality holds.
Theorem 3. A bimatrix game (A, B) is a locally minimal NE-free game if and only if it satisfies the following four conditions:
(i) it is square, that is, |I| = |J| = n;
(ii) there exist two one-to-one mappings (permutations) σ : I → J and δ : J → I such that their graphs, gr(σ ) and gr(δ), are
disjoint in I × J , or in other words, if (i, σ (i)) 6= (δ(j), j) for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J;
(iiia) the entry a(δ(j), j) is the unique maximum in column j and a second largest (though not necessarily unique) in row δ(j);
(iiib) the entry b(i, σ (i)) is the unique maximum in row i and a second largest (though not necessarily unique) in column σ(i).
Obviously, in any bimatrix game atmost one such pair of permutations (σ , δ) can exist and its existence can be verified in
O(n2) time. Thus, Theorem3 gives a linear time algorithm for verifying localminimality. Yet, its definition itself immediately
results in an O(n3) time recognition algorithm.
The ‘‘if’’ part of Theorem 3 is easy: we just repeat the same arguments as in Example 1. Let us assume that conditions
(i, ii, iiia, iiib) hold and show that (A, B) has no Nash equilibria, that is, no situation (i, j) ∈ I× J is the best simultaneously in
its row i, with respect to b, and in its column j, with respect to a. Indeed, for each situation (i, j)we have: b(i, σ (i)) > b(i, j)
whenever (j 6= σ(i)) and a(δ(j), j) > a(i, j)whenever (i 6= δ(j)). Moreover, at least one of these two strict inequalities must
hold, since otherwise (i, σ (i)) = (δ(j), j) = (i, j), in contradiction to condition (ii).
Remark 1. In particular, 2n situations (i, σ (i)), i ∈ I , and (δ(j), j), j ∈ J , forma strict improvement cycle. It is not surprising,
since such cycle must exist in every NE-free bimatrix game.
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Now, let us delete a row i ∈ I and consider two columns: j = σ(i) and j′ = δ−1(i), row i′ = σ−1δ−1(i), and three
situations: (i, j) = (i, σ (i)), (i, j′) = (i, δ−1(i)), and (i′, j′) = (σ−1δ−1(i), δ−1(i)). Let us show that (i′, j′) is a Nash
equilibrium. Indeed, b(i′, j′) is the uniquemaximum in the row i′ and a(i′, j′) is a second largest in the column j′, by definition
of σ . Yet, the unique maximum b(i, j′) in the column j′ was deleted with the row i. Hence, (i′, j′) is a Nash equilibrium in the
remaining matrix.
Similarly, if we delete a column j ∈ J , the situation (σ−1(j), δ−1σ−1(j)) becomes a Nash equilibrium.
However, the ‘‘only if part’’ of Theorem 3 is more difficult and we postpone its proof till Section 3.
1.4. On minimal Nash equilibrium free bimatrix games
Clearly, every minimal NE-free bimatrix game is locally minimal and, hence, it must satisfy all conditions of Theorem 3.
Yet, not vice versa. A locally minimal NE-free bimatrix game can be not minimal for two reasons.
First, I × J might contain a proper NE-free subgame I ′ × J ′ disjoint from gr(δ) ∪ gr(σ ).
Second, a locally minimal NE-free game I × J might be decomposed into two NE-free subgames. Let us consider the
superpositions τ = δσ : I → I and µ = σδ : J → J . A permutation pi : S → S is called transitive if the orbit of each
element of S is the whole set S. It is obvious and well known that τ and µ can be transitive, or not, only simultaneously. It
is also clear that if they are not transitive then I × J can be decomposed, that is, there are two partitions I = I ′ ∪ I ′′ and
J = J ′ ∪ J ′′ such that all four sets I ′, I ′′, J ′, J ′′ are non-empty and
gr(δ) ∪ gr(σ ) ⊆ (I ′ × J ′) ∪ (I ′′ × J ′′).
Then, obviously, both subgames I ′ × J ′ and I ′′ × J ′′ satisfy all conditions of Theorem 3 and, hence, they are both NE-free
and locally minimal. (Also, they are square, |I ′| = |J ′| = n′, |I ′′| = |J ′′| = n′, n′ + n′′ = n). Thus, the original game I × J is
locally minimal but not minimal. Summarizing, we obtain the following conditions that are necessary for minimality.
Proposition 1. Each minimal NE-free bimatrix game is locally minimal and, in particular, it is square. Moreover, the product
τ = δσ : I → I (or equivalently, µ = σδ : J → J) of the permutations defined by Theorem 3 is transitive. 
Hence, to verify the minimality of a locally minimal NE-free game we have to test for NE-freeness its proper square
subgames. Yet, many of them can be excused from inspection.
Lemma 1. If τ and µ are transitive then a proper subgame I ′ × J ′ ⊂ I × J has a Nash equilibrium whenever
(gr(δ) ∪ gr(σ )) ∩ (I ′ × J ′) 6= ∅. (1.5)
Proof. Assume indirectly that a subgame is NE-free, although (1.5) holds. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that
I ′× J ′ contains a situation (i, j) = (i, σ (i)) ∈ gr(σ ). By definition of σ , this situation (i, j) is a Nash equilibrium unless I ′× J ′
also contains (i1, j) = (δσ (i), σ (i)). In its turn, by definition of δ, the situation (i1, j) is a Nash equilibrium unless I ′× J ′ also
contains (i1, j1) = (δσ (i), σδσ (i)), etc. We conclude that (I ′ × J ′) ⊇ gr(σ ) ∪ gr(δ). Yet, in this case I ′ × J ′ = I × J , that is,
the considered subgame is not proper in contradiction to our assumptions. 
Summarizing, we obtain the following necessary and sufficient conditions for minimality.
Proposition 2. A bimatrix game (A, B) is a minimal NE-free game if and only if there exist two permutations δ and σ satisfying
all conditions of Theorem 3 and Proposition 1 and such that no square subgame I ′ × J ′ disjoint from gr(δ) ∪ gr(σ ) is a locally
minimal NE-free game. 
Although all subgames that are not square or intersect gr(σ )∪ gr(δ) can be excused, still, exponentially many subgames
remain for inspection. For this reason, we conjecture that verifying minimality is NP-hard.
Remark 2. Let us note that locally minimal (and minimal) games that have Nash equilibria (in particular, saddle points)
are trivial: each player in such a game has only one strategy. This is true for k-person games, as well. Indeed, if situation
j = (j1, . . . , jk) is a Nash equilibrium then one can delete any other strategy of any player and still, j remains a Nash
equilibrium in the obtained subgame.
1.5. Tight and solvable two-person game forms
Somewhat informally, a game form is a ‘‘game in normal form in which payoffs are not yet given’’. More precisely, given
finite sets of strategies I and J of players R and C , respectively, and a set of outcomes A = {a1, . . . , ap}, a game form is a
mapping g : I × J → A. It is convenient to represent a game form by a matrix whose entries are elements of A; consider, for
example, the two 2× 2 game forms given in Fig. 1.
A game form g is called Nash-solvable if for each pair of utility functions uR : A → R and uC : A → R the obtained
bimatrix game (g, uR, uC ) has a Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 1. Two 2× 2 game forms.
Furthermore, g is called zero-sum-solvable if for each u : A→ R the obtained zero-sum game, with uR = u and uC = −u,
has a saddle point.
Finally, g is±1-solvable if (g, u) has a saddle point for each zero-sum u that takes only two values:+1 and−1.
Yet, we will soon see that all these properties are in fact equivalent.
For example, g2 in Fig. 1 is Nash-solvable, while g1 is not.
Given g : I × J → A, let us assign a Boolean variable to each outcome a ∈ A and denote it for simplicity by the same
symbol a. Furthermore, let us assign to g two monotone Disjunctive Normal Forms (DNFs):
DR(g) =
∨
i∈I
∧
j∈J
g(i, j) and DC (g) =
∨
j∈J
∧
i∈I
g(i, j).
Let us notice the similarity between these two DNFs and the maxmin and minmax. For the above two examples we get
DR(g1) = DC (g1) = a1a2; DR(g2) = a1 ∨ a2a3, DC (g2) = a1a2 ∨ a1a3.
Let us denote by FR(g) and FC (g) the monotone Boolean functions defined by the DNFs DR(g) and DC (g), respectively.
Remark 3. Indeed, FR and FC are monotone, since, by definition, DNFs DR and DC contain no negations. Yet, elementary
conjunctions of DR or DC can contain one another, unlike prime implicants of FR and FC .
For example, the following three DNFs
D = a1∨a2a3,D′ = a1∨a2a3∨a1a2, andD′′ = a1∨a2a3∨a1a2∨a2a3a4 define the same Boolean function F = a1∨a2a3.
A game form g is called tight if the corresponding functions FR(g) and FC (g) are dual, F dR (g) = FC (g), or equivalently,
F dC (g) = FR(g).
For example, g2 is tight, while g1 is not; indeed,
FR(g2)d = (a1 ∨ a2a3)d = a1(a2 ∨ a3) = a1a2 ∨ a1a3 = FC (g2), while
FR(g1)d = (a1a2)d = a1 ∨ a2 6= a1a2 = FC (g1).
This definition of tightness can be reformulated in several equivalent ways as follows. Given a game form g : I × J → A
and two more mappings σ : I → J and δ : J → I , let us consider two subsets of A : [σ ] = g(gr(σ )) and [δ] = g(gr(δ)). In
particular, let σj : I → {j} ∈ J and δi : J → {i} ∈ I denote mappings σ and δ that take a unique value.
Proposition 3. The following properties of a game form are equivalent:
(i) g is tight;
(ii) [σ ] ∩ [δ] 6= ∅ for each σ and δ;
(iiiR) for each σ there is a j ∈ J such that [σj] ⊆ [σ ];
(iiiC) for each δ there is an i ∈ I such that [δi] ⊆ [δ]. 
All these reformulations are well known; see for example [8,9]. It appears that all variants of solvability defined above are
equivalent, too.
Theorem 4 ([8], see also [9]). The following properties of a game form g are equivalent:
(i) g is Nash-solvable;
(ii) g is zero-sum-solvable;
(iii) g is±1-solvable;
(iv) g is tight. 
A game form g is called solvable if it has these equivalent properties.
Remark 4. The concepts of tightness and Nash-solvability can be naturally generalized for the k-person game forms, see
Section 5. However, they are no longer equivalent. Already for k = 3, tightness is neither necessary nor sufficient for Nash-
solvability; see [9].
Remark 5. ‘‘Whether a game form g : I × J → A is tight’’ is a difficult decision problem, at least, no polynomial algorithm
is known. However, it is very unlikely that this problem is NP-complete, since there is a quasi-polynomial algorithm given
by Fredman and Khachiyan [7]. Its running time is p`+ `o(log `), where |A| = p, m = |I|, n = |J|, and ` = m+ n.
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1.6. Minimal and locally minimal not tight two-person game forms
A complete characterization is given by the following statement.
Theorem 5. The families of minimal and locally minimal not tight game forms coincide; all these game forms are of size 2× 2.
It is easy to verify that up to an isomorphism (permutations of rows, columns, and transposition), there exist seven 2×2
game forms:
a1 a2
a2 a1
a1 a2
a3 a1
a1 a2
a3 a4
a1 a1
a2 a2
a1 a1
a2 a3
a1 a1
a1 a2
a1 a1
a1 a1
The last four are tight, the first three are not. In other words, a 2×2 game form is tight if and only if it contains a constant
line, row or column, whose two entries coincide. Theorem 5 easily results from Theorems 2 and 4.
Indeed, let g be a locally minimal not tight game form. By definition of tightness, there is a utility function u : A → R
such that the obtained zero-sum game (g, u) has no saddle point. Furthermore, since g is a locally minimal not tight game
form, a saddle point appears in (g, u) after deleting any strategy i ∈ I or j ∈ J . Thus, (g, u) is a locally minimal SP-free game
and, by Theorem 2, it is of size 2× 2. 
Yet, we have no characterization of minimal or locally minimal not tight k-person game forms for k > 2. Somewhat
surprisingly, it appears difficult to characterize locally minimal tight k-person game forms even for k = 2.
1.7. Minimal and locally minimal tight two-person game forms
At first, let us notice that all minimal tight game forms are trivial, that is, they are of size 1× 1. Moreover, for each k ≥ 2,
all minimal tight k-person game forms are trivial, too.
In contrast, characterization of locally minimal tight two-person game forms seems difficult. We obtain only some
necessary and some sufficient conditions for local minimality. However, Fredman and Khachiyan’s algorithm [7] provides
a quasi-polynomial oracle for verifying tightness of a game form g; see Remark 5. Hence, one can also verify in quasi-
polynomial time whether g is a locally minimal tight game form.
Let us recall that a game form g : I × J → A is tight if and only if its Boolean functions FR(g) and FC (g) are dual.
Furthermore, let
[i] = {g(i, j) | j ∈ J} ⊆ A and [j] = {g(i, j) | i ∈ I} ⊆ A
denote the set of outcomes of row i ∈ I and column j ∈ J , respectively. Then
DR(g) =
∨
i∈I
∧
a∈[i]
a and DC (g) =
∨
j∈J
∧
a∈[j]
a.
A (monotone) DNF is called irredundant if its prime implicants do not contain one another. In particular, FR(g) and FC (g)
are irredundant if [i] ⊆ [i′] for no distinct i, i′ ∈ I and [j] ⊆ [j′] for no distinct j, j′ ∈ J , respectively. If both these conditions
hold then the game form g itself will be called irredundant, too. Obviously, irredundancy is necessary for local minimality.
Proposition 4. If g is a locally minimal tight game form then DR(g) and DC (g) are dual irredundant monotone DNFs.
Proof. Indeed, DR(g) and DC (g) are dual by definition of tightness. Moreover, they are irredundant, since otherwise one can
delete a row i ∈ I or column j ∈ J and the reduced game form remains tight. 
Given a game form g : I × J → A, row i ∈ I , column j ∈ J , and an outcome a ∈ A, let
k(i, a) = |{j′ ∈ J | g(i, j′) = a}| and k(j, a) = |{i′ ∈ I | g(i′, j) = a}|
denote the number of occurrences of a in the row i and column j; if k(i, a) = 1 or k(j, a) = 1, we will say that a is a singleton
in i or j, respectively.
The following conditions are sufficient for local minimality of g .
Proposition 5. An irredundant tight game form g : I × J → A is locally minimal whenever k(i, a) 6= 1 and k(j, a) 6= 1 for all
i ∈ I, j ∈ J , and a ∈ A, or in other words, if all rows and columns contain no singletons.
Proof. Let us delete, say, a row i ∈ I . Since DNF DR(g) is irredundant, by this, the correspondingmonotone Boolean function
FR(g)will be strictly reduced. On the other hand, FC (g)will remain the same, since k(a, j) 6= 1 for all a ∈ A and j ∈ J . Hence,
although a = g(i, j) is deleted from the column j, yet, this column contains another entry g(i′, j) = a. Thus, the reduced
game form cannot be tight, since its two DNFs are no longer dual. 
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Example 2. To illustrate Proposition 5 let us consider the DNF D whose prime implicants are assigned to the lines of the
Fano plane:
D = a0a1a4 ∨ a0a2a5 ∨ a0a3a6 ∨ a1a2a3 ∨ a3a4a5 ∨ a5a6a1 ∨ a2a4a6.
It is known that the corresponding function F is self-dual, that is F d = F . Let us consider an irredundant game form g such
that DR(g) = DC (g) = D. For example,
a0 a0 a0 a1 a4 a1 a4
a0 a0 a0 a2 a5 a5 a2
a0 a0 a0 a3 a3 a6 a6
a1 a2 a3 a1 a3 a1 a2
a4 a5 a3 a3 a3 a5 a4
a1 a5 a6 a1 a5 a5 a6
a4 a2 a6 a2 a4 a6 a2
Clearly, conditions of Proposition 5 hold for g , that is, k(i, a) 6= 1 and k(j, a) 6= 1 for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J , and a ∈ A.
Indeed, for each line ` of the Fano plane and a point x in it there are another two lines that intersect ` in x. Hence, by
Proposition 5 the above 7× 7 game form is a locally minimal tight one.
Less obvious sufficient conditions for local minimality will be given in Section 4. They are weaker than the conditions of
Proposition 5 but still not necessary.
2. Proof of Theorem 2
Let A be a matrix game given by a mapping a : I × J → R. Assume indirectly that A has no saddle point but it appears
whenever we delete a row or column of A. In particular, after we delete a row i ∈ I a situation (i′, j) becomes a saddle point.
By definition, it means that the entry a(i′, j) becomes (although it was not) maximal in column j and it is minimal in row
i′. From this we derive that a(i, j) is the unique maximum, while a(i′, j) is a second largest entry (not necessarily unique)
of column j. Indeed, it is easy to see that otherwise (i′, j) could not become a saddle point. Furthermore, we conclude that
m = |I| ≤ |J| = n, since for each i ∈ I there is a j ∈ J such that a(i, j) is the unique maximum in column j.
Similarly, after we delete a column j ∈ J a situation (i, j′) becomes a saddle point. By definition, it means that the entry
a(i, j′) becomes (although it was not) minimal in row i and it is maximal in column j′. From this we derive that a(i, j) is
the uniqueminimum, while a(i, j′) is a second smallest entry (not necessarily unique) of row i. Indeed, it is easy to see that
otherwise (i, j′) could not become a saddle point. Then, we conclude thatm = |I| ≥ |J| = n, since for each j ∈ J there exists
an i ∈ I such that a(i, j) is a unique minimum in row i. Thus,m = n.
Furthermore, for each row i ∈ I its uniqueminimum entry a(i, j) = a(i, σ (i)) is a secondmaximal in the column j = σ(i).
Similarly, for each column j ∈ J its unique maximum entry a(i, j) = a(δ(j), j) is a second minimal in the row i = δ(j).
Thus, we obtain two one-to-one mappings (permutations) σ : I → J and δ : J → I . Let us notice that for each i ∈ I
and j ∈ J inequality (i, σ (i)) 6= (δ(j), j)must hold, since otherwise the original matrix would have a saddle point. In other
words, graphs of σ and δ in I × J are disjoint, gr(σ ) ∩ gr(δ) = ∅.
Let us note that |I × J| = n2, while |gr(σ ) ∪ gr(δ)| = 2n. If n = |I| = |J| = 2 then gr(σ ) ∪ gr(δ) = I × J, that is, these
two graphs partition the matrix. In this case we obtain a locally minimal SP-free game.
However, if m = n > 2 then there exists a situation (i, j) such that (i, j) 6∈ gr(σ ) ∪ gr(δ). This case results in a
contradiction, since, by definition of σ and δ, we have
a(i, j) > a(i, σ (i)) ≥ a(δ(j), σ (i)) ≥ a(δ(j), j) > a(i, j).
Indeed, entry a(i, σ (i)) is the unique minimum in its row i and a second largest in its column σ(i); respectively, a(δ(j), j) is
the unique maximum in its column j and a second smallest in its row δ(j). It remains to add that
(δ(j), σ (i)) 6∈ gr(σ ) ∪ gr(δ),
since both σ : I → J and δ : J → I are one-to-one mappings. 
3. Proof of Theorem 3
The ‘‘if part’’ was already proven in the Introduction. Let us now prove the ‘‘only if’’ part. Given a locally minimal NE-free
bimatrix game (A, B) = (a : I × J → R, b : I × J → R), let us denote by Ni (respectively, by N j) the set of Nash equilibria
that appears after the row i ∈ I (respectively, column j ∈ J) is deleted.
Claim 1 i. If (i′, j′) ∈ Ni then a(i, j′) is the unique maximum in column j′, while a(i′, j′) is a second maximal entry (not
necessarily unique) in this column.
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Proof. Indeed, situation (i′, j′) was not a Nash equilibrium in the original matrix but it becomes one after row i is deleted.
Hence, a(i, j′) > a(i′, j′); moreover, a(i′′, j′) > a(i′, j′) for no other i′′ ∈ I . In particular, a(i′′, j′) = a(i, j′) for no i′′ distinct
from i. Hence, a(i, j′) is a unique maximum in column j′, while a(i′, j′) is a second maximal entry (perhaps, not unique) in
this column. 
Respectively, for N j the following similar statement holds.
Claim 1 j. If (i′, j′) ∈ Nj then b(i′, j) is a unique maximum in row i′, while b(i′, j′) is a second maximal entry (not necessarily
unique) in this row. 
Let us denote by R(Ni), R(N j) ⊆ I and C(Ni), C(N j) ⊆ J , respectively, the sets of the rows and columns of the equilibria Ni
and N j. In other words, R(Ni) and R(N j) (respectively, C(Ni) and C(N j)) are projections of sets Ni and N j into I (respectively,
into J).
Claim 2 i. For every distinct i, i′ ∈ I we have C(Ni) ∩ C(Ni′) = ∅.
Proof. Assume indirectly that j ∈ C(Ni)∩C(Ni′). Then, by Claim 1 i, each entry a(i, j) and a(i′, j)must be a uniquemaximum
in j. Hence, i = i′ and we get a contradiction. 
Respectively, for columns we get a similar statement.
Claim 2 j. For every distinct j, j′ ∈ J we have R(N j) ∩ R(N j′) = ∅. 
Furthermore, Claim 2 i (respectively, Claim 2 j) immediately implies thatm ≤ n (respectively, n ≤ m), and hence,m = n.
Claim 3. Every locally minimal NE-free bimatrix is square, that is, n = |J| = |I| = m. 
Claim 4. For every i ∈ I and j ∈ J we have |C(Ni)| = |R(N j)| = 1.
Proof. Indeed, this Claim easily results from Claims 2 and 3. 
Thus, we assign a unique column C(Ni) to each row i ∈ I and unique row R(N j) to each column j ∈ J . Claims 2, 3, and 4
imply that both mappings are one-to-one. Let us denote them by δ−1 and σ−1, respectively:
δ−1 : i→ C(Ni) ∈ J; and; σ−1 : j→ R(N j) ∈ I.
This notation appears to be consistent with Section 1.3.
Claim 5. In each row i ∈ I the payoff b(i, j) takes a unique maximum at situation (i, σ (i)).
Respectively, in each column j ∈ J the payoff a(i, j) takes a unique maximum at situation (δ(j), j).
Proof. All these claims follow from the definitions of σ , δ, and Claim 1. 
Now we are ready to ‘‘transpose’’ Claim 2. Indeed, Claim 5 implies the following statement.
Claim 6. For every distinct i, i′ ∈ I we have R(Ni) ∩ R(Ni′) = ∅.
Respectively, for every distinct j, j′ ∈ J we have C(N j) ∩ C(N j′) = ∅. 
Furthermore, Claim 4 and 6 imply that only one Nash equilibrium appears after deleting a row or column.
Claim 7. For each row i ∈ I and column j ∈ J we have |(Ni)| = |(N j)| = 1. 
From definitions of σ , δ, and Claim 1 we derive the explicit formulas:
Ni = {(σ−1δ−1(i), δ−1(i))} and N j = {(σ−1(j), δ−1σ−1(j))}.
Finally, let us recall Claim 1 once more and derive the last statement.
Claim 8. The entry a(i, σ (i)) is a second maximal (not necessarily unique) in the column σ(i).
Respectively, b(δ(j), j) is a second maximal (not necessarily unique) in the row δ(j). 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3 
4. More about locally minimal tight game forms
Let us return to sufficient conditions of Proposition 5.
Example 3. The following game form g
a1 a3 a3 a5 a5 a1
a1 a3 a4 a4 a1 a3
a2 a2 a3 a5 a5 a3
a2 a2 a4 a4 a1 a1
satisfies these conditions. It is easy to see that g is tight and irredundant. Indeed, its DNFs
DR(g) = a1a3a5 ∨ a1a3a4 ∨ a2a3a5 ∨ a1a2a4 and
DC (g) = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a4 ∨ a4a5 ∨ a5a1 ∨ a1a3
are irredundant and dual. Furthermore, functions k(i, a) and k(j, a) take only values 0 and 2 for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J , and a ∈ A.
Hence, conditions of Proposition 5 hold and g is a locally minimal tight game form.
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Yet, conditions of Proposition 5 are not necessary for local minimality.
Example 4. Let us consider the following game form g:
a1 a2 a3 a3 a2
a4 a2 a3 a3 a2
a4 a5 a3 a5 a4
a4 a5 a6 a5 a4
a1 a5 a6 a1 a6
a1 a2 a6 a1 a6
It is easy to see that g is tight and irredundant, since its monotone DNFs
DR(g) = a1a2a3 ∨ a2a3a4 ∨ a3a4a5 ∨ a4a5a6 ∨ a5a6a1 ∨ a6a1a2 and
DC (g) = a1a4 ∨ a2a5 ∨ a3a6 ∨ a1a3a5 ∨ a2a4a6
are irredundant and dual. Yet, conditions of Proposition 5 fail. Indeed, it is easy to see that each row contains a singleton
(rows i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6 contain singletons a1, a4, a3, a6, a5, a2 in columns j1, j1, j3, j3, j2, j2, respectively). Nevertheless, g is
a locally minimal tight game form. To show it we have to verify that after deleting a row or column the reduced game form
becomes not tight. Indeed, deleting a rowwill strictly reduce FR(g), while FC (g) remains the same, since no column contains
a singleton. Hence, the reduced game form is not tight. For the same reason, it cannot remain tight after deleting one of the
last two columns. Hence, we have to verify only the first three columns. Due to symmetry, all the three cases are equivalent.
For example, after deleting the first column we get a reduced game form g ′ with DNFs
DR(g ′) = a2a3 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a4a5 ∨ a4a5a6 ∨ a5a6a1 ∨ a6a1a2 and
DC (g ′) = a2a5 ∨ a3a6 ∨ a1a3a5 ∨ a2a4a6
that are not dual, and hence, the reduced game form is not tight.
To understand this example better we need some new concepts. Given a game form g : I × J → A, by definition,
g(i, j) ∈ [i] ∩ [j]. A situation (i, j) ∈ I × J is called simple if [i] ∩ [j] = {g(i, j)}.
Remark 6. All situations of a tight game form g are simple if and only if DR(g) and DC (g) are dual irredundant read-once
DNFs.
Remark 7. In Example 2, all situations, except for the seven diagonal ones are simple. In Example 3 all situations are simple,
except for (i1, j5), (i1, j6), (i2, j6), (i2, j3), (i3, j2), (i4, j1); for example, [i4]∩[j1] = {a1, a2}. If we substitute a1 for g(i4, j1) = a2
then the obtained game form g ′ will contain the singleton a2 in the first column j1 and last row i4. Hence, conditions of
Proposition 5 do not hold for g ′. Moreover, it is easy to check that g ′ is tight but not locally minimal tight game form. In
contrast, in Example 2, in which 7 diagonal situations (i`, j`) are not simple, one can substitute arbitrary outcomes from
[i`] ∩ [j`] for g(i`, j`) for ` = 1, . . . , 7 and still all obtained game forms satisfy conditions of Proposition 5 and hence they
are all locally minimal.
Proposition 6. If g is a tight game form then for every i ∈ I and a ∈ [i] there exists a j ∈ J such that g(i, j) = a and (i, j) is
simple, that is [i] ∩ [j] = {a}. Respectively, for every j ∈ J and a ∈ [j] there exists an i ∈ I such that g(i, j) = a and (i, j) is
simple. 
This is a well-known property of dual DNFs; see, for example, [4].
Let us now return to Example 4. Note that g(i5, j1) = a1 and k(i5, a1) = 2, since g(i5, j4) = a1, too. However, the situation
(i5, j4) is not simple: [i5] ∩ [j4] = {a1, a5}. Similarly, g(i4, j1) = a4 and k(i4, a4) = 2, since g(i4, j5) = a4, too. However, the
situation (i4, j5) is not simple: [i4]∩ [jj] = {a4, a6}. For this reason, after we delete column j1 from g the obtained game form
is not tight. Indeed, its DNF DR contains implicants a1a5a6 and a4a5a6 generated by rows i5 and i4, respectively, instead of
a5a6, which is a prime implicant of F dC .
A situation (i, j) will be called a hidden singleton in i (respectively, in j) if k(i, a) ≥ 2, (respectively, k(j, a) ≥ 2), where
a = g(i, j), and the situation (i, j) is simple, while any other situations (i, j′) such that g(i, j′) = a (respectively, (i′, j)) such
that g(i′, j) = a) is not simple. A hidden singleton (i, j) in i (respectively, in j) is called effective if [i] \ {a} ⊃ [i′] \ {g(i′, j)}
for no i′ ∈ I (respectively, if [j] \ {a} ⊃ [j′] \ {g(i, j′)} for no j′ ∈ J). We can weaken the sufficient conditions of Proposition 5
as follows.
Proposition 7. An irredundant tight game form g : I × J → A is locally minimal whenever for each simple situation (i, j) such
that g(i, j) = a and k(i, a) = 1 (respectively, k(j, a) = 1) there exists an effective hidden singleton in j (respectively, in i).
Proof. If we delete a row i (column j) that contains no singletons, that is, k(j, g(i, j)) ≥ 2 for each j ∈ J (respectively,
k(i, g(i, j)) ≥ 2 for each i ∈ I) then we can just repeat the arguments from the proof of Proposition 5. If i or j contains
a singleton then it must also contain an effective hidden singleton and hence, the reduced game form still cannot be
tight. 
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Clearly, Proposition 7 provides sufficient conditions for local minimality that are weaker than in Proposition 5. However,
they are still not necessary. An example is pretty complicated, so we start with two preliminary constructions.
Example 5. Consider the following irredundant tight game form g .
a1 a2 a1 a2
a5 a5 a1 a3
a6 a6 a1 a3
a5 a5 a4 a2
a6 a6 a4 a2
a5 a5 a4 a3
a6 a6 a4 a3
DR(g) = a1a2 ∨ a1a3a5 ∨ a1a3a6 ∨ a2a4a5 ∨ a2a4a6 ∨ a3a4a5 ∨ a3a4a6,
DC (g) = a1a5a6 ∨ a2a5a6 ∨ a1a4 ∨ a2a3; F dR = FC .
If we delete the first row, the reduced game form g1 is no longer tight. Indeed,
DR(g1) = a1a3a5 ∨ a1a3a6 ∨ a2a4a5 ∨ a2a4a6 ∨ a3a4a5 ∨ a3a4a6,
DC (g1) = a5a6 ∨ a5a6 ∨ a1a4 ∨ a2a3; F dR (g1) 6= FC (g1).
Let us note that the first row contains singletons in the first two columns, while all other rows do not contain singletons.
Yet, the last two columns contain singletons, too (in fact, in each row, except the first one). It is easy to verify that after
deleting the third or forth column the reduced game form remains tight.
Hence, we need to modify (and substantially enlarge) this example.
Example 6. Let us consider the following irredundant tight game form g ′
a′1 a
′
1 a
′
2 a
′
2 a
′
5 a
′
5 a
′
6 a
′
6
a′1 a
′
1 a
′
2 a
′
2 a
′
7 a
′
8 a
′
7 a
′
8
a′3 a
′
4 a
′
3 a
′
4 a
′
5 a
′
5 a
′
6 a
′
6
a′3 a
′
4 a
′
3 a
′
4 a
′
7 a
′
8 a
′
7 a
′
8
DR(g ′) = a′1a′2a′5a′6 ∨ a′1a′2a′7a′8 ∨ a′3a′4a′5a′6 ∨ a′3a′4a′7a′8,
DC (g ′) = a′1a′3 ∨ a′1a′4 ∨ a′2a′3 ∨ a′2a′4 ∨ a′5a′7 ∨ a′5a′8 ∨ a′6a′7 ∨ a′6a′8; F dR (g ′) = FC (g ′).
Notice that all situations of g ′ are simple, since FR(g ′) and FC (g ′) are dual read-once Boolean functions:
FR(g ′) = (a′1a′2 ∨ a′3a′4)(a′5a′6 ∨ a′7a′8),
FC (g ′) = (a′1 ∨ a′2)(a′3 ∨ a′4) ∨ (a′5 ∨ a′6)(a′7 ∨ a′8).
Now let us define a game form g ′′ = g + g ′, where g is from Example 5:
a1a2a1a2 a1a2a1a2 a1a2a1a2 a1a2a1a2 a1a2a1a2 a1a2a1a2 a1a2a1a2 a1a2a1a2
a5a5a1a3 a5a5a1a3 a5a5a1a3 a5a5a1a3 a5a5a1a3 a5a5a1a3 a5a5a1a3 a5a5a1a3
a6a6a1a3 a6a6a1a3 a6a6a1a3 a6a6a1a3 a6a6a1a3 a6a6a1a3 a6a6a1a3 a6a6a1a3
a5a5a4a2 a5a5a4a2 a5a5a4a2 a5a5a4a2 a5a5a4a2 a5a5a4a2 a5a5a4a2 a5a5a4a2
a6a6a4a2 a6a6a4a2 a6a6a4a2 a6a6a4a2 a6a6a4a2 a6a6a4a2 a6a6a4a2 a6a6a4a2
a5a5a4a3 a5a5a4a3 a5a5a4a3 a5a5a4a3 a5a5a4a3 a5a5a4a3 a5a5a4a3 a5a5a4a3
a6a6a4a3 a6a6a4a3 a6a6a4a3 a6a6a4a3 a6a6a4a3 a6a6a4a3 a6a6a4a3 a6a6a4a3
a′1a
′
1a
′
1a
′
1 a
′
1a
′
1a
′
1a
′
1 a
′
2a
′
2a
′
2a
′
2 a
′
2a
′
2a
′
2a
′
2 a
′
5a
′
5a
′
5a
′
5 a
′
5a
′
5a
′
5a
′
5 a
′
6a
′
6a
′
6a
′
6 a
′
6a
′
6a
′
6a
′
6
a′1a
′
1a
′
1a
′
1 a
′
1a
′
1a
′
1a
′
1 a
′
2a
′
2a
′
2a
′
2 a
′
2a
′
2a
′
2a
′
2 a
′
7a
′
7a
′
7a
′
7 a
′
8a
′
8a
′
8a
′
8 a
′
7a
′
7a
′
7a
′
7 a
′
8a
′
8a
′
8a
′
8
a′3a
′
3a
′
3a
′
3 a
′
4a
′
4a
′
4a
′
4 a
′
3a
′
3a
′
3a
′
3 a
′
4a
′
4a
′
4a
′
4 a
′
5a
′
5a
′
5a
′
5 a
′
5a
′
5a
′
5a
′
5 a
′
6a
′
6a
′
6a
′
6 a
′
6a
′
6a
′
6a
′
6
a′3a
′
3a
′
3a
′
3 a
′
4a
′
4a
′
4a
′
4 a
′
3a
′
3a
′
3a
′
3 a
′
4a
′
4a
′
4a
′
4 a
′
7a
′
7a
′
7a
′
7 a
′
8a
′
8a
′
8a
′
8 a
′
7a
′
7a
′
7a
′
7 a
′
8a
′
8a
′
8a
′
8
FR(g ′′) = DR(g) ∨ DR(g ′)
= (a1a2 ∨ a1a3a5 ∨ a1a3a6 ∨ a2a4a5 ∨ a2a4a6 ∨ a3a4a5 ∨ a3a4a6)∨
(a′1a
′
2a
′
5a
′
6 ∨ a′1a′2a′7a′8 ∨ a′3a′4a′5a′6 ∨ a′3a′4a′7a′8),
FC (g ′′) = DC (g) ∧ DC (g ′)
= (a1a5a6 ∨ a2a5a6 ∨ a1a4 ∨ a2a3)∧
(a′1a
′
3 ∨ a′1a′4 ∨ a′2a′3 ∨ a′2a′4 ∨ a′5a′7 ∨ a′5a′8 ∨ a′6a′7 ∨ a′6a′8);
F dR (g
′′) = FC (g ′′).
Thus, game form g ′′ is tight. Furthermore, it is easy to see that there are no singletons in the rows, while columns have
singletons and they all are in the first row. Hence, to verify local minimality of the g ′′ it is enough to check that it becomes
not tight after deleting the first row. Clearly, the latter claim holds for g ′′ if and only if it holds for g , and this was already
4466 E. Boros et al. / Discrete Mathematics 309 (2009) 4456–4468
verified in Example 5. Thus, g ′′ is a locallyminimal tight game form, indeed. Yet, sufficient conditions of Propositions 5 and 7
fail for g ′′, since all its singletons are located in one row.
5. On maximal stable effectivity functions
Let us also consider an example from cooperative game theory.
Given a set of players (or voters) I = {1, . . . , n} and a set of outcomes (or candidates) A = {a1, . . . , ap}, subsets K ⊆ I
are called coalitions and subsets B ⊆ A blocks. An effectivity function (EFF) is defined as a mapping E : 2I × 2A → {0, 1}. We
say that coalition K ⊆ I is effective (respectively, not effective) for block B ⊆ A if E(K , B) = 1 (respectively, E(K , B) = 0).
Since 2I × 2A = 2I∪A, we can say that E is a Boolean function whose set of variables I ∪ A is a mixture of the players and
outcomes.
The ‘‘complementary’’ function, V(K , B) ≡ E(K , A \ B), is called veto function; by definition, K is effective for B if and
only if K can veto A \ B. Both the names are frequent in the literature [1,14,13,15,16,5,10,11,6]. An EFF is called monotone,
superadditive, subadditive, and convex, respectively, if the following implications hold:
E(K , B) = 1, K ⊆ K ′ ⊆ I, B ⊆ B′ ⊆ A ⇒ E(K ′, B′) = 1,
E(K1, B1) = 1, E(K2, B2) = 1, K1 ∩ K2 = ∅ ⇒ E(K1 ∪ K2, B1 ∩ B2) = 1,
E(K1, B1) = 1, E(K2, B2) = 1, B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ ⇒ E(K1 ∩ K2, B1 ∪ B2) = 1,
E(K1, B1) = 1, E(K2, B2) = 1, ⇒ E(K1 ∪ K2, B1 ∩ B2) = 1 or E(K1 ∩ K2, B1 ∪ B2) = 1.
Monotonicity will be always assumed. The name is consistent with Boolean terminology, since an EFF E is monotone if
and only if the corresponding Boolean function E : 2I∪A → {0, 1} is monotone. Wewill also assume that all considered EFFs
satisfy the following boundary conditions:
E(K , B) = 1 if K 6= ∅, B = A or K = I, B 6= ∅;
E(K , B) = 0 if K = ∅, B 6= A or K 6= I, B = ∅.
In particular, we assume that E(I,∅) = 0 and E(∅, A) = 1. Hence, by monotonicity, E(K ,∅) = 0 and E(K , A) = 1 for all
K ⊆ I .
Furthermore, let Xi be a finite set of strategies of a player i ∈ I . The direct product X = ∏i∈I Xi is a set of situations. A
mapping g : X → A is a game form. To each game form g let us assign an EFF Eg as follows:
Eg(K , B) = 1 iff ∃ xK = (xi : i ∈ K) such that
g(xK , xI\K ) ∈ B ∀ xI\K = (xi : i 6∈ K).
In other words, a coalition K ⊆ I is effective for a block B ⊆ A if and only if the players of K have strategies that guarantee
that the outcome will belong to B for any strategies of the remaining players.
In 1983 Moulin [13] proved that an EFF E is playing, i.e., E = Eg for a game form g , if and only if E is monotone,
superadditive, and the boundary conditions hold.
Given a utility function u : I × A → R, its value u(i, a) is interpreted as a profit of the player (voter) i ∈ I in case the
outcome (candidate) a ∈ A is elected.
Given an EFF E , utility function u, a coalition K ⊆ I , and outcome a0 ∈ A, consider the set of all outcomes strictly and
unanimously preferred to a0 by all coalitionists of K , that is,
PR(K , a0, u) = {a ∈ A | u(i, a) > u(i, a0) ∀ i ∈ K} ⊆ A.
We say that a coalition K ⊆ I rejects an outcome a0 ∈ A if E(K , PR(K , a0, u)) = 1, that is, if K can guarantee a strictly better
result than a0 to all coalitionists.
Given E and u, the core C(E, u) is defined as the set of outcomes not rejected by any coalition, that is,
C(E, u) = {a ∈ A | E(K , PR(K , a, u)) = 0 ∀ K ⊆ I} ⊆ A.
This is a natural, and surely the simplest, concept of solution in cooperative game theory. Yet, the core is frequently
empty, since there are too many, 2n, coalitions.
An EFF E is called stable if the core C(E, u) is not empty for any u.
In 1984 Peleg proved [15] that every convex EFF is stable.
It is easy to see that convex EFFs are subadditive and superadditive [15,10,11].
By definition, stability is anti-monotone, that is, if E is stable and E ′ ≤ E then E ′ is stable, too. Hence, maximal and locally
maximal stable EFFs coincide. It is an important problem to characterize them. Indeed, such a characterization would also
imply a characterization of stable EFFs.
Let us remark that, given an EFF E , it is anNP-complete problem to decidewhether E is stable [2]. The following important
family of the maximal stable EFFs is well known.
To each EFF E let us assign the dual EFF Ed defined by formula:
E(I \ K , A \ B)+ Ed(K , B) = 1 ∀ K ⊆ I, B ⊆ A.
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In other words, Ed(K , B) = 1 if and only if E(I \ K , A \ B) = 0. Again, the name ‘‘dual’’ is consistent with Boolean
terminology, since two (monotone) EFFs are dual if and only if the corresponding two (monotone) Boolean functions are
dual.
Respectively, an EFF E is called self-dual if E(I \ K , A \ B)+ E(K , B) = 1, that is, K is effective for B if and only if I \ K is
not effective for A \ B.
Let us notice that a game form g is tight if and only if the corresponding EFF Eg is self-dual.
The stable self-dual EFFs form an interesting class. In 1982 Abdou [1] proved that they are both subadditive and
superadditive. They are also convex.
Moreover, it is not difficult to see that the following three subfamilies of the self-dual EFFs coincide: stable self-dual EFFs,
convex self-dual EFFs, and subadditive and superadditive self-dual EFFs, see for example, [10,11].
Furthermore, it is easy to show that stable self-dual EFFs are the maximal stable EFFs, in other words, an EFF E is not
stable whenever E > E ′, where E ′ is a self-dual EFF. Indeed, in this case E(K , B) = E(I \ K , A \ B) = 1 for some K ⊆ I and
B ⊆ A. Let us define a utility function u such that K prefers B to A \ B, while I \ K , on the contrary, prefers A \ B to B, and
both preference are unanimous and strict. Clearly, in this case the core is empty, C(E, u) = ∅, since all outcomes of A are
rejected: B by I \ K and A \ B by K . Thus, EFF E is not stable.
The self-dual EFFs (and corresponding veto functions) are frequently calledmaximal in the literature [1,14,13,15,16,5,6].
This name is logical, since, aswehave just demonstrated, the self-dual stable EFFs aremaximal stable EFFs. Itwas conjectured
that there are no other maximal stable EFFs; see [13], Problem 25, and also [5]. However, this conjecture was disproved
in [10], see also [6].
Example 7. Given 3 players, I = {1, 2, 3}, and 6 outcomes A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6}, let us define a monotone EFF E as
follows. Each coalition that consists of 2 players, that is, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, or {3, 1}, is effective for blocks
{a1, a3}, {a3, a5}, {a5, a1}, {a2, a4}, {a4, a6}, {a6, a2},
as well as for every block that contains one of the listed above. Each coalition that consists of 1 player, that is, {1}, {2} or {3},
is effective only for the total set of outcomes A. Finally, the total coalition I is effective for every non-empty block.
It is not difficult to show that EFF E is stable. For example, sufficient conditions of stability obtained in [2] hold. Let us
prove that E is not majorized by a stable self-dual EFF. Assume indirectly that such an EFF exists: E ′ is stable, self-dual, and
E ′ > E .
Let us show that, although EFF E is stable, stability disappears whenever we strengthen a coalition of cardinality 2. Let us
assume, without any loss of generality, that coalition {1, 2} becomes effective for block {a1, a4}, that is, E ′({1, 2}, {a1, a4}) =
1, while equations
E ′({2, 3}, {a3, a5}) = E ′({3, 1}, {a2, a6}) = 1
hold too. Let us consider a utility function u such that
u(1, a1) = u(1, a4) > u(1, a2) = u(1, a6) > u(1, a3) = u(1, a5),
u(2, a3) = u(2, a5) > u(2, a1) = u(2, a4) > u(2, a2) = u(2, a6),
u(3, a2) = u(3, a6) > u(3, a3) = u(3, a5) > u(3, a1) = u(3, a4).
Obviously, in the game (E ′, u), coalitions {1, 2}, {2, 3}, and {3, 1} reject outcomes {a2, a6}, {a1, a4}, and {a3, a5},
respectively. Hence, C(E ′, u) = ∅ and the obtained EFF E ′ is not stable.
Thus, to enlarge E , it only remains to strengthen coalitions {1}, {2}, and {3} of cardinality 1. Then, to get a (unique) self-
dual EFF E ′ one should make each of these 3 coalitions effective for the following 12 blocks:
{a1, a2, a3, a4}, {a2, a3, a4, a5}, {a3, a4, a5, a6},
{a4, a5, a6, a1}, {a5, a6, a1, a2}, {a6, a1, a2, a3},
{a1, a2, a4, a5}, {a2, a3, a5, a6}, {a3, a4, a6, a1},
{a4, a5, a1, a2}, {a5, a6, a2, a3}, {a6, a1, a3, a4},
as well as for each block that contains one of the listed above. Again, the obtained EFF E ′ is not stable, since, for example,
E ′({1}, {a1, a2, a3, a4}) = E ′({3}, {a3, a4, a5, a6}) = E ′({2}, {a5, a6, a1, a2})
= E ′({1}, {a2, a3, a5, a6}) = E ′({2, 3}, {a1, a4}) = 1.
Moreover, it is easy to see that E ′ cannot be stable, or superadditive, or convex, since if it is then the total coalition I is
effective for the empty block. Thus, we got a stable EFF E that is not majorized by any stable self-dual EFF. Hence, there are
maximal stable EFFs that are not self-dual.
Similarly, we can show that the same EFF E cannot be majorized by a convex EFF, either. Assume indirectly that there is
a convex EFF E ′ such that E ′ > E . Then
E ′({1, 2}, {a1, a3}) = E ′({1, 3}, {a4, a6}) = 1
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and, since E ′ is convex, we have
E ′({1}, {a1, a3, a4, a6}) = 1 or E ′({1, 2, 3}, {∅}) = 1.
In fact, the first equation must hold, since the second one is in contradiction with the boundary conditions. Furthermore,
due to symmetry, we also obtain that
E ′({2}, {a2, a4, a5, a1}) = E ′({3}, {a3, a5, a6, a2}) = 1.
It is easy to verify that the obtained three equations and convexity of E ′ contradict the boundary conditions, too.
Alternatively, copying the above arguments, we can show that E ′ is not stable and, hence, by Peleg’s theorem, it is not
convex either.
Thus, the suggested EFF E is stable but inequality E < E ′ cannot hold for any convex or stable and self-dual EFF E ′.
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